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OLIVERA-TANZI EFFECT: THEORY 
AND IT'S MANIFESTATION IN THE 
CROATIAN STABILIZATION PROGRAMME 
 




Inflation is often considered to be the apple of paradise, despite all the 
unpleasant experiences with it. 
 
When the government consumption, according to some rough 
estimations, amounts over 50°/o of gross domestic product, and when, 
therefore, the changes in the field of public finances can have serious 
implications, the possible effects of inflation on the budget become of 
great concern, as well as the effects of inflation on the economy as a 
whole. It is already well known that the power to issue money provides 
some additional resources for the government, in the form of the so 
called seigniorage. But, on the other hand, printing money may cause 
inflation which could influence the real collection of "normal" taxes. 
Recently, The Republic of Croatia has experienced high rates of 
inflation accompanied by a decline in real public revenues. In other 
words, Olivera-Tanzi effect occurred. 
 
The aim of the paper is to explain the mechanisms of functioning of 
Olivera-Tanzi effect, to describe the experiences of those countries 
where that effect happened, to identify the circumstances under which 
it arises, and to estimate the intensity as well as the reasons for its 
occurrence in Croatia before and after the beginning of implementation 
of the Stabilisation programme. The authors' intention was to find the 
answer to the question whether the circumstances changed in last two 
years, or the same things would have happened if the initial price 
increase had been allowed. The authors want to induce further 
investigations in the field of interrelations between inflation and fiscal 
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policy, and the investigation of relationship between the fiscal and 
monetary policies as well. 
 
In the second part of the paper the logic of the Olivera-Tanzi effect is 
presented, taking the Olivera-Tanzi effect as a dynamic process 
happening to the real revenue from inflation as well as to the real 
revenue from "normal" taxes, in the period of accelerated inflation. 
 
The third part is the overview of the experiences of a number of 
countries that faced the selfperpetuating interrelation between inflation 
and fiscal deficit. Olivera-Tanzi effect in the Republic of Croatia in the 
period 1992 - 1994 will be empirically analysed in the fourth part. In 
the fifth, concluding part we give some suggestions that follow from the 
findings based on the Croatian experience, as well as the suggestions 
for the future policymaking. 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE OLIVERA-TANZI EFFECT 
 
The theory has already become familiar with the term Olivera-Tanzi 
effect and it has been used in describing the decrease in the real 
government revenues in the period of rising inflation.1 Government 
revenues could be considered a sum of revenues from "normal" taxes, 
and the revenues from inflation tax. In connection with this, there are 
two parallel processes going on behind Olivera-Tanzi effect. The first 
one is the process of the reaction of the real inflation tax revenues to 
the rate of inflation, and the second one is the reaction of the real tax 
revenues from "normal" sources (e.g. sales tax, corporation income tax, 
personal income tax) to the rate of inflation. 
 
                                                          
1 This phenomenon was first noticed after the very first hyperinflation (according to 
Cagan's definition), the one that occurred in Germany after the World War I 
(Bresciani-Turroni, 1936, in: Canavese, Heymann, 1992). The phenomenon got its 
name later, after J. H. G. Olivera (1967) and V. Tanzi (1977) who were the first to 
interpret it by means of the standard analytical tools. 
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The revenue from the inflation tax can be seen as the tax rate - the 
inflation rate, B multiplied by the tax base - the real money balances m. 
According to Cagan (1956) the real demand for money changes with 
respect to the rate of inflation. In other words, the real demand for 
money moves according to the expression: 
 
(1)     m=m0 e-aB, 
 
where a denotes the coefficient of the sensitivity of the real demand for 
money with respect to the anticipated rate of inflation, and mo denotes 
the demand for money when n = 0. The real revenue from the inflation 
tax is, then, 
 
(2)     I R = B m0 e-aB 
 
The inflation tax maximizing rate of inflation is B=1/", that means that 
the revenue from the inflation tax reaches its maximum when the 
elasticity of the demand for money with respect to the rate of price 
change is unity.2 
 
On the other hand, the revenue from "normal" taxes also responds to 
the price increase. If the tax system is generally progressive, the real 
tax revenues could stay unchanged when prices increase, or even rise. 
Nevertheless, if the inflation is high, it can be expected with greater 
certainty that the government would collect smaller amount of taxes in 
real terms, and that the loss of real resources would be the greater the 
longer the lag between the moment the taxable event occurred and the 
moment the government collects the tax (Tanzi, 1978). The case of the 
                                                          





















loss of real tax revenues induced by inflation is known as Olivera-Tanzi 
effect. 
 
The real value of the "normal" taxes the government collects, assuming 
that the elasticity of the real tax revenues to the increase in real GDP, 
is then: 
 





(4)   
 
where T0 denotes the effective tax burden in the inital period, n is the 
average collection lag expressed in months, and β denotes the 
coefficient of the average collection lag expressed in months. 
 
Total revenue in the period of inflation will then be the sum of the 
expressions (2) and (4), or 
 
(5)    
 
The rate of inflation that maximizes the total government revenue is 3 
 
(6)    
 
 
The expression                    in the denominator is positive, which  
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means that the rate of inflation maximizing total government revenue 
is, due to the destructive influence of the inflation on the real revenues 
from "nominal" taxes, lower than the rate of inflation that would 






Assuming the rate of inflation were exogenous, the choice of the 
adequate rate of inflation involves great responsibility, for it can 
influence the revenues from the inflation tax on one hand, and the 
revenues from the "normal" taxes on the other hand. The above 
analysis shows that: 
a) the lower the initial level of the real money balances, and the 
greater the share of the government revenues collected 
through "normal" taxes, the greater the fall of the total 
revenues caused by inflation, and the lower the rate of inflation 
maximizing the total revenues,  
b) the lower the initial tax burden, and the bigger the share of 
inflation tax in the total revenues, the higher the rate of 
inflation that maximizes the total revenues, 
c) the greater the sensitivity of demand for money with respect to 
price changes, the smaller the revenues from inflation tax, and 
the lower the rate of inflation that maximizes the total 
revenues, 
d) the larger the collection lag, the bigger the erosion of the real 
revenues caused by inflation, and the lower the rate of inflation 
that maximizes the total government revenues.4 
 
                                                          
4 It has to be pointed out that the former analysis of the revenues from the inflation 
tax is based on following assumptions: 1) the only cause of inflation is the 
inflationary finance of the fiscal deficit, 2) the money supply changes only as a 
consequence of the deficit financing, 3) that inflationary expectations equal the 
actual price changes, 4) that the monetary multiplier equals 1, that is, private banks 








Olivera-Tanzi effect is the case when the price increase exceeds the 
optimal rate of inflation and when the erosion of real collection of tax 
revenues surmounts the gains from any further money creation. The 
moment when this will happen depends on parameters m0, T0, β and ". 
On the other hand, whether the Olivera-Tanzi effect would operate and 
will it operate strongly or not, will depend on the features of the tax 
system. In other words, Olivera-Tanzi effect will be the' stronger, 
a) the lower the progressivity of all forms of taxes, that means the 
lower the elasticities of "normal" tax revenues with respect to 
the price increase, 
b) the higher the share of indirect sales taxes and excises with 
specific tax rates in total tax revenues, 
c) the more difficult the tax system accommodates to the price 
increases by introducing discretionary measures like e. g. 
increase in tax rates, shortening the statutory lag for paying 
taxes, by raising up penalties for paying taxes after they fall 
due, indexing tax bases and strengthening the tax 
administration. 
 
Some analyses show that the Olivera-Tanzi effect causes the increase 
in fiscal deficit. This follows from the fact that the nominal government 
expenditures increase almost instantaneously and in the same 
proportion as prices, that is, they do not change in real terms. Along 
with the decline of the real government revenues, this causes the 
steady rise of the fiscal deficit. Therefore, having no possibility for 
revenues to keep the pace with the price increase and with the rise of 
nominal expenditure other then the initial deficit, the government faces 
certain amount of unintended deficit, which depends on the rate of 
inflation. 
 
The inflation itself, however, is often a consequence of unsustainable 
fiscal deficit. In other words, when there are limited possibilities for 
broadening the tax base, when the domestic capital market is 
insufficiently developed, and the level of external reserves is low, 
money creation is the only possible way to finance the surplus of 
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government expenditures over the government revenues. The mutual 
relationship between the fiscal deficit and inflation is almost perfect 
under such circumstances. It is then obvious that the simultaneous link 
between the inflation and the fiscal deficit causes a selfperpetuating 
interference of those two phenomena, whereby every further step of 
this interference means a higher rate of inflation and deficit. It seams 
logical to raise the question whether there is some rate of inflation at 
which those tendencies stop, that means some rate of inflation that 
would provide for the government some inflation tax revenue that 
would be sufficient to cover the initial deficit as well as the deficit 
provoked by inflation, or does that process necessarily lead to an 
explosion of the deficit and inflation (Kiguel, 1989; Choudhry, 1990; 
Canavese, Heymann, 1992). 
 
If the initial amount of fiscal deficit is 
 
(7)     D0 = G0 – T0   , 
 
in times of inflation, owing to the collection lag it becomes 
 




(9)     DB  = D0 + d (B)  , 
 
In the above expressions D = fiscal deficit, T = tax revenues, G = 
government expenditures, d = a part of the actual deficit, which 
depends on the rate of inflation. 
 
Equilibrium is reached when the real inflation revenues match the total 
deficit, that is when DB = IR (Choudhry, 1990). 
 
The fiscal deficit function is the increasing one since its first order 
derivative is positive. That means that the real fiscal deficit increases 
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together with the rate of inflation, and that it reaches its maximum 
since its second order derivative is negatives.5 
 
If one assumes the function of the demand for real money balances of 
the Cagan type, and the shape of the fiscal deficit function mentioned 
above, the equilibrium inflation rate can be determined graphically  
(Figure 1). 
 
The equilibrium is reached where the two schedules intersect. There 
are two such points - one at the low inflation rate, B L, and one at high 
rate of inflation, B H. Since the second order derivatives of both 




















schedules are negative in the neighbourhood of low equilibrium 
inflation rate, stable equilibrium is reached at that inflation rate. 
Namely, at that level of inflation any further monetary expansion leads 
to the increase in real revenues from the inflation tax and diminishes 
the deficit, thereby reducing the need for further inflationary finance 
and leading the system to the equilibrium. If the initial fiscal deficit is so 
high that there is no monetary expansion that could cover it, there is no 
equilibrium rate of inflation. Such unsustainable level of fiscal deficit 
could be even the one that is lower than the maximum revenue from 
inflation, since there is the part of unintended fiscal deficit caused by 
the rate of inflation maximizing the inflation tax. When there is no 
stable equilibrium of that dynamic process, any further attempt to 
increase inflation revenue through money creation deepens the gap 
between the real government revenues and the real government 
expenditures (Choudhry, 1990). 
 
From the above analysis one can conclude that if there is a possibility 
for Olivera-Tanzi effect to occur, there are at least two arguments in 
favour of low, rather then high inflation. High inflation can, on one 
hand, lead to great loss in real tax revenues. On the other hand, high 
inflation causes the increase in the difference between the real 
government revenues and real government expenditures and can 
provoke the selfgenerating and intensifying interrelation of fiscal deficit 
and inflation, thus destabilizing monetary and fiscal sphere of 
macroeconomics. 
 
3.  OLIVERA-TANZI EFFECT IN SOME  
     EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS 
 
Many investigations imply that the Olivera-Tanzi effect followed almost 
all high inflations. Among those investigations there are those on the 
phenomena at the time and after extreme inflationary financing in 
Austria, Germany, Poland and Hungary after the World War I (Franco, 
1990), in Columbia, Dominican Republic, Brazil and Indonesia in the 
late 50's and 60's (Aghevli, Khan, 1977 and 1978), in Argentina in the 
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late 60's and 70's (Tanzi, 1977) and in Bolivia in the period of 
hyperinflation in 1985 (Sacks, 1985). 
 
 
The experiences of Austria, Hungary, Poland  
and Germany after the World War I 
 
The fall of the Habsburg monarchy caused economic crises in two 
newly established, and therefore politically and economically rather 
weak countries - Austria and Hungary. As it seems natural for such 
political circumstances, these crises were reflected in high budget 
deficit of both countries, which resulted in the first hyperinflation to be 
recorded. The stabilization programmes in both countries were initiated 
and supported by the League of Nations, which was the predecessor of 
to-day IMF. The most important parts of the stabilization programmes 
were fiscal reforms, and the stopping of the decrease of the value of 
domestic currency (Franco, 1990). The data show that in Austria, there 
were no significant changes in real government expenditures, while at 
the same time there was a sudden increase in tax revenues, which 
made it possible to balance the state budget. It is very interesting that 
the League of Nation, predicted the similar developments in Hungary, 
drawing upon the experiences of Austria. The predictions happened to 
be correct. In Hungary there also occurred the decline of the fiscal 
deficit during the implementation of the stabilization programme, that is 
after stopping inflation, whereby the major contribution to that 
decrease came from the rise in exactly those taxes that were 
untouched by the fiscal reform (consumption tax, duties). The League 
of Nations cited in its final reports on the stabilization programmes in 
Austria and Hungary that "budget equilibrium followed (the 
stabilisation), it did not precede". 
 
The Polish crisis in the beginning of the 20's of this century was caused 
by the political factors, too. In 1919, after having been split among 
Russian, Habsburg and German empires for hundred years, the new 
Poland appeared within entirely new borders. The Polish economic crisis 
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was characterized by the growth of the public sector and very high 
discrepancy between the public expenditures and public revenues. In a 
young country, that has only a limited choice of instruments for 
financing fiscal deficit, inflation was a logical consequence. The 
stabilization programme that started in 1923 did not succeed in 
stopping the expansion of the public expenditures, and the inflationary 
finance partly continued even after the central bank became 
independent from the state. Namely, the government retained the right 
to print coins and small notes. In the 1924 and 1925 the money 
creation decreased, and due to the positive influence of the fall of 
inflation to the real tax revenue, the budget was almost balanced. 
 
The case of Germany is similar to the cases of Austria and Hungary 
regarding the reactions of real tax revenues to the rate of inflation. On 
the other hand, the difference is in that the explosion of prices in 
Germany after the World War I. was not simply the consequence of 
insufficient power of the state to collect resources to finance public 
needs, but it was the result of the collapse of the public finances 
caused by paying war reparation obligations. The stabilization 
programme aimed at placing the existing tax system on a "golden 
basis" in the period of the high inflation (in 1919 and 1920 it reached 
about 900% a year) and very low coverage of the public expenditures 
by the public revenues. Though there was no lowering of public 
expenditures, the situation in the budget recovered very quickly due to 
the increase in real collection of tax revenues. 
 
In all the four examples of hyperinflation there occurred losses in the 
fiscal system, that is, there was Olivera-Tanzi effect. The main 
prerequisite of the Olivera-Tanzi effect in the cases mentioned above 
was inflationary financing of the budget deficit that resulted in 
extremely 'high rates of inflation, which, in the situation of inefficient 
tax administrations of those countries, and together with the long 
collection lags caused inflation to "bite" a part of the tax revenues. 
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The experiences of Brazil, Columbia, Thailand,  
Dominican Republic and Indonesia 
 
The following cases of the countries for which the relationship between 
the fiscal deficit and inflation was to a certain extent different. That are 
the cases of Dominican Republic, Columbia and Thailand in the period 
1961 - 1974, and in Brazil between 1964 and 1974. Those countries 
had in that period the rates of inflation of various levels, but their 
common characteristics were undeveloped capital market and the 
limited space for broadening the tax base. Therefore the inflation tax 
remained as the only possibility of financing even the lowest budget 
deficit. The proof that there was Olivera-Tanzi effect can be drawn from 
the fact reached by Aghevli and Khan (1978), which states that in all of 
the four countries concerned it took much more time for tax revenues 
to accommodate the price changes than it was the case with public 
expenditures, regardless what was the initial inflation level. 
 
A typical example of the Olivera-Tanzi effect were the events in 
Indonesia in the period 1951 - 1972 (Aghevli, Khan, 1977). The price 
increase started at the end of 50's when the financial needs of the 
government rose due to the political turmoil, and the crisis was even 
sharpened by heavy draught that in 1961 led to the drastical decrease 
in food supplies and to the additional price increase. That caused the 
serious increase in nominal government expenditures. As the rise in the 
government revenues considerably fell behind the price increase, the 
government was forced to finance the deficit by money creation. The 
selfperpetuating process of increase in deficit and inflation occurred, so 
that in the middle of the 60's inflation almost reached the 
hyperinflationary level. The element that contributed to the slow 
accommodation of the real government revenues to the price increase 
was the inefficient method of tax collection, the structure of the tax 
revenues where the indirect taxes and taxes of international trade 
prevailed. The econometric analysis showed that for the 
accommodation of the tax level to the price level it took 4.5 months on 
the average, whereby the expenditures reacted to the price increase 
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with an average fag of only 1.5 months, that is three times faster. 
Therefore, the Indonesian case showed that when the prices increase, 





The fall of real tax revenues in Argentina, in the period 1968 - 1976 
was analysed by Tanzi (1978). His analysis is limited solely to the 
revenue side of the budget, but it takes into account "normal" tax 
revenues as well as the inflation tax revenues, and deals with the 
behaviour of their sum. From the beginning until the end of the period 
considered, inflation climbed from one-digit level to the three-digit 
level, that is to 400% percent. The price development reflected in the 
development of the real tax revenues, which, in that period of time fell 
from almost 20% share in the GDP to 12-13% of GDP in the period of 
the highest inflation. 
 
Tanzi described the relationship between the price increase and the fall 
of the real tax revenues with the expression according to which the 
total revenues are TRB = Bm0e-"B + (T0/(1+B)n). He simulated the 
development of the total revenues by taking the initial share of taxes in 
GDP, which amounted to 20% or 0.2, as the tax burden at zero 
inflation (T0). For the coefficient m0 (the share of the money balances 
in the GDP) he used its preinflationary level of 15%, that is 0.15. He 
calculated that the weighted average collection lag for the whole period 
was 5 months. Tanzi estimated econometrically the value of the 
parameter " (the sensitivity of the demand for money with respect to 
the rate of inflation), and found out that its value changed in that 
period, that is, in the period with low inflation it was 2.458, and in the 
years with high inflation it was 0.564. By introducing the values of the 
needed parameters in the formula for total revenues, Tanzi showed 
that the actual total real revenues of the government followed almost 
the same pattern as his formula predicted. The "normal" tax revenues 
were falling along with the increase in inflation, while the inflation tax 
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revenues were increasing in the first period, and decreasing later, as 
the consequence of the fall of the demand for the real money balances. 
At the same time Tanzi explained that the maximal attainable real 
government revenue depends on the coefficient of the sensitivity of the 
demand for money with respect to the rate of inflation. At low rates of 
inflation, the demand for money reacts heavily to the fall in the real 
value of money, so it showed that in the beginning of the development 
of the inflationary spiral, due to the narrowing of the base of the 
inflation tax, the total revenue-maximizing rate of inflation was 15%. 
Later, at the high level of inflation the ratio of money to GDP becomes 
so low that it was impossible for it to get any lower, and the sensitivity 
of the demand for money with respect to inflation decreased. Under 
such circumstances the total revenue maximizing rate in Argentina was 
100%. At rates higher than 100% the erosion of the collection of the 
real "normal" revenues would be so strong that it would be producing 
negative effects that offset the positive effects of the inflation tax 
revenues. 
 
The Bolivian experience 
 
Very strong Olivera-Tanzi effect was noticed in the Bolivian 
hyperinflation in 1985-86 (Sachs). After the World War II it was the 
only one hyperinflation in the sense of the Cagan definition of 
hyperinflation, and one of the highest inflations ever. In the first half of 
1985 inflation amounted to 26000%, and from May to August 1985 
even 60000%. The cause of that very high inflation was the complete 
loss of the credibility of the government incurring debt crisis, and it was 
directly initiated by the imbalance in the balance of payments, caused 
by the price decrease of the Bolivian export products in the 
international market. Before the inflation started, the Bolivian tax 
system was very weak. The former governments accumulated deficits 
and the problem of how to finance them had been solved by foreign 
indebtedness. When it was not possible any more, governments shifted 
to money creation. As the time passed by, inflation got an incredible 
acceleration, while, at the same time, the real inflation tax revenues 
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failed to increase on one hand, and the real collection of all other taxes 
collapsed. In spite of the sharp decrease in the government 
expenditures, the deficit became the persistent problem. With the 
beginning of implementation of the stabilization programme at the end 
of 1985 the real tax revenues of the central government rose 
considerably. The main reason was the effect of the devaluation of 
pesos on the prices of the energents and, according to that, the 
increase of the ability of public enterprises (state oil company) to pay 
taxes. Already in the following year the budget was balanced, and it 
even became slightly positive. 
 
The Bolivian experience is just another example of how easy it is to get 
into the whirlpool of inflation and fiscal deficit, that is, how easy the 
Olivera-Tanzi effect starts to operate, but they show as well that the 
increase in real government revenues usually occurs once the price 
stabilisation has been started. 
 
It can be observed that the relationship between the real tax revenues 
and the rate of inflation has been noticed, but there was different 
attention given to it, or it was analysed differently. The conclusions 
about that relationship have been reached upon the insight into the 
data on the development of the rate of interest and the real tax 
revenues, on the basis of the tests of simple regressions, but also by 
constructing more complex models with simultaneous equations. 
 
The results of the analysis, regardless of the analytical method, show 
that in the conditions that lead into inflation, the interrelations between 
the level of real tax revenues and the rate of inflation are being 
induced. The examples imply that the fiscal deficit, no matter where it 
does stem from, is in the majority of cases the initiator of those 
unfavourable developments. The deficit is, thus, the necessary, but not 
the sufficient condition for the Olivera-Tanzi effect to happen. The 
sufficient condition is that there is no possibility for the government to 
cover the deficit in noninflationary ways. The negative relationship 
between the real tax revenues and inflation is the stronger the more 
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regressive the tax system as a whole, that is, the more is it based on 
the indirect and specific taxes, the weaker the tax administration, the 
looser the fiscal discipline of the tax payers, and the more difficult the 
tax system accommodates to the price increase (by indexing the tax 
bases, by increasing the tax rates and by shortening the collection 
lags). 
 
As for the indexation of the tax bases, it has to be emphasized that 
some countries (Israel for example), remained uninfected by the 
domino-effect of the inflation and deficits, thanks to the introduction of 
the system of comprehensive indexation at the right time (Sadka, 
1990). But, such a way of fighting the Olivera-Tanzi effect succeeds 
only by chance and in relatively stable economies. Therefore, there is a 
general recommendation to keep away from taking inflation as remedy 
for satisfying the increasing needs of the government, or, what seems 
even better, to keep the government consumption on those levels that 
the government can afford.6 
                                                          
6 The aforementioned examples could be misused, or they could be misunderstood. 
They are all cases of very high inflations and hyperinflations, so they could lead to a 
conclusion that there is a danger only if there is an excessive inflation. On the 
contrary, one has to infer differently. The cases of very high inflations and 
hyperinflations are being considered because hyperinflation, like the picture under 
the microscope, allows us to see some things clearer then it could be possible in 
some less extreme cases. What can be seen in the moments of hyperinflation can 
easily happen even when the intensity of the price increase is not so strong. So one 
has to take the advice given by Choudhry (1993) which says that, thanks to the 
causal relationship between the deficit and inflation, the sustainable level of deficit 
is much lower than it has usually been thought. In the same way, even in small 
doses, inflation is a very dangerous way of collecting taxes, because very low 
inflation can also have negative influence on the budget balance, the higher the tax 
burden in the country (the share of the taxes in GDP) and the lower the ratio of 
money to GDP. 
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4.  OLIVERA-TANZI EFFECT IN THE CROATIAN  
     STABILIZATION PROGRAMME OF 1993 
The theoretical framework given by Julio G. Olivera and Vito Tanzi on 
the effect of inflation on inflation tax revenue, real "normal" and real 
total taxes gives clear determinants of the fiscal policy in the period of 
the implementation of the stabilization programme. The classical 
Olivera-Tanzi relationship between inflation and real tax burden (Figure 
2) is the one when the maximum of the share of the inflation tax in the 
GDP (IR) is reached at the rate of inflation BA (point A), the ratio of the 
real normal taxes in GDP (T) falls together with the inflation, and 
maximum of the real total taxes (TR) is therefore reached at lower rate 
of inflation, BB (point B). This shape of "normal" tax curve is 
characterised by the tax system without indexation, in which the 
collection lags cause the inflationary devaluation of the real tax 
revenues, which, at unchanged level of the real expenditures results in 
fiscal deficit. The deficit is the smaller the lower the inflation rate, and it 
is predominantly financed by inflation tax. In the interval between BA 
and BB the decrease of deficit caused by disinflation is greater then the 
loss of the inflation tax. The same levels of the real fiscal revenues 
(points C and D, for example) can be attained at the different rates of 
inflation, BC and BD, respectively. Although lowering of the rate of 
inflation from BC to BD would be neutral from the fiscal point of view, 
those two combinations have completely different macroeconomic 
implications. At point C real expenditures are covered by normal taxes 
and by inflation tax, that means there is some deficit, while at the point 
D the deficit is being eliminated, as well as the inflation tax as the 
source of its financing. 
 
The fiscal position, such as in the point D, is the policy known as 
"financing out of real sources". Since the inflation tax is equally "real" 
as any other tax (Dornbusch, 1991), such a mixture of financing should 
probably be named "financing out of stable sources". The emphasis in 
the analysis of the Olivera-Tanzi effect should be on the stability of the 
sources of finance. 
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The effect of disinflation on fiscal revenues of a country depends on the 
factors that determine the position, the shape and the structure of the 
curve of the total real tax revenues, and that are the characteristics of 
the fiscal, monetary and the whole economic system of a country. 
 
In the countries passing the phase of disinflation the points of 
maximum of inflation tax and total taxes change. That means that such 
processes cause some shifts in the possible sources of financing 
government expenditures, and that the way how the monetary 
phenomena affect fiscal phenomena change, as well. The Tanzi's 
findings for Argentina, that the total fiscal revenue-maximizing rate of 
inflation was considerably lower at the lower than at the higher inflation 
rates, show clearly that there was some shift of one or both 
components of the real total taxes. Structural shift of the curves in the 
two-dimensional space determined by the inflation and the fiscal 
revenues could be attributed to some third variable. In the inflation tax 
component that could only be the variables that are not included in the 
Tanzi's specification of the demand for the real money balances. 
 
The empirical analyses of the Croatian stabilization show that under the 
strong currency substitution the exchange rate is one variable causing 
structural shift of the inflation tax curve. If the country implements a 
heterodox antiinflationary programme, the intensity of the reverse 
currency substitution is the stronger, the higher the credibility of the 
programme. The shifts of the normal taxes can be influenced by the 
reverse currency substitution as well, but also by those essential 





The money demand function applied by Olivera and Tanzi, as well as by 
the others afterwards could be characterised as a long term money 
demand function, based on very rigid assumptions of unitary income 
elasticity and of the zero elasticity of demand for money with respect to 
the other alternative measures of the opportunity cost, like exchange 
rate for example. 
 
In analysing the demand for money at high inflation rate the short time 
dynamics of the accommodation of the actual level of money balances 
to the preferred level ofmoney holdings is of great importance (Hwang, 
1985). The sensitivity of the demand for money in short term depends 
also on the velocity of that accommodation. However, the most serious 
shortcoming of the specification of the money demand function used is 
the omittance of the opportunity cost of holding money. The theoretical 
analysis shows that in the full specification (including the elements of 
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the opportunity costs like interest rate and/or exchange rate) of the 
demand for money in high inflation and high currency substitution 
countries, the coefficient at the rate of inflation would "hide" the 
parameters of the accommodation of the demand for money and the 
parameters of "money illusion" (Anušić, Rohatinski and Šonje, ed., 
1995).7 Similarly, the coefficient at the opportunity cost of the 
alternative financial instruments would describe the additional elements 
like the strength of the effect of substitution of the domestic with the 
foreign currency and/or with the interest holding deposits. If the 
opportunity cost is tightly linked to inflation (or indexed), like this is 
often the case in the high inflation countries, then the total influence of 
inflation on demand for money is reflected in several parameters, not 
only in the coefficient ". In this way, all those effects are implicitly 
included in the coefficient ". By neglecting opportunity costs from the 
specification of the money demand function, the estimate at the 
inflation rate reflects and "hides" a part of the interest rate and/or 
exchange rate elasticity of the demand for money, too. 
 
The econometric estimation of the full specification of the demand for 
money in the Republic of Croatia showed that in the period after the 
stabilisation measures have been introduced, a significant increase in 
the elasticity of the demand for money with respect to the interest rate 
and with respect to the change of the exchange rate happened (Anušić, 
Rohatinski and Šonje, ed., 1995). In other words, the fall of the 
nominal exchange rate in the period of stabilisation is much more 
reflected in the increase in money demand then it would have been the 
case in the period before the stabilisation programme. Equally, if there 
was the depreciation of exchange rate in the prestabilisationary 
manner, the decrease of the demand for the domestic currency would 
be four times greater than in the period before stabilisation. 
 
                                                          
7 The parameter of "money illusion" descrihes the sensitivity of the preferred level 
of money with respect to inflation (Patinkin, 1965: Gapinski, 1982). 
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The econometric estimation of the inflation tax in Croatia in the period 
before and after stabilisation. 
 
In this paper the specification of the money demand function in Croatia 
is based on the theoretical background of the short term money 
demand function in the presence of currency substitution and without a 
priori estimation of the coefficient of "money illusion" and the pattern of 
the accommodation of the actual level of money holdings to the 
preferred level. The specification includes the income variable without 
the a priori assumption on the unitary income elasticity of money 
demand. This hypothesis will be tested econometrically. Furthermore, in 
contrast to the theory, the specification does not include the elements 
of the opportunity costs (like interest rate or the rate of change of the 
exchange rate). It is expected that the omission of those variables 
would result in higher price elasticity than the one in the full 
specification. The used form also contains the variable of the structural 
shift of the inflation rate in the period after stabilisation in order to test 
the hypothesis that the revenue-maximizing rate of inflation changed 
after the stabilisation programme has been introduced. The 
econometric estimation of such money demand function in the period 
January 1991 - October 1994 gives us the following results: 
 
Imt = 0.0443 + 0.8505 Imt-1 + 0.1587 IYt - 0.5698 INFLAt  
         (0.55)     (30.47)            (2.52)         (-6.72) 
         - 2.6270 (INFLAt*DUM9311Xt) - 0.0303 DUM1t - 0.0424 DUM2t  
            (-1.31)                                 (-0.79)             (-1.12) 
         + 0.0027 DUM4t - 0.0210 DUM5t - 0.0052 DUM6t + 0.0696DUM7t  
            (0.07)               (-0.58)             (-0.14)              (1.87)  
         + 0.0149 DUM8 t - 0.0320 DUM9 t + 0.0389 DUM10 t 
         (0.41)               (-0.87)              (1.05)     
      - 0.0054 DUM11 t + 0.0582 DUM12 t 
          (-0.13)                (1.49) 
 





Im = the logarithm of the real value of M1 at the end of month,  
Im t = In (M1 t/P t), where P, stands for the implicit deflator of GDP,  
IY = the logarithm of the real GDP, 
INFLA = the rate of the change in the implicit deflator of GDP,  
INFLA t = (P t/P t-1 -1), 
DUM9311X t = binary variable for the period 1993:11-1994:10; 
DUM9311X = 1 in that period, and DUM9311X = 0 in all other months, 
DUM x = binary variable for the month X; DUM x = 1 in the month X,  
and DUM x = 0 in all other months. 
 
The estimated elasticity of the demand for money in the period before 
stabilisation was -0.5698*B  and for the period after stabilisation -
3.1968*B. This means that the revenue maximizing rate of inflation in 
the period before stabilisation is: 
 
B*pre = 175.5% a month, 
 
and in the period after stabilisation: 
 
B* post = 31.3% a month. 
 
The estimated income elasticity of the money demand is 1.06, that is 
close to the upper boundary of the elasticity in the Baumol-Tobin 
theory of the money demand, as well as to the assumption taken by 
Tanzi in his theoretical framework.8 
 
The shift of the inflation tax curve in the period after the stabilisation 
can be seen on the Figure 3.9 
 
                                                          
8 By dividing the estimated equations by the income level the original form of the 
equation used by Tanzi in his paper could be obtained. 
9 In this paper we give the graphics of the Olivera-Tanzi effect with the rate of 
inflation on the X axis and with the tax burden on the Y axis. 
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The values of both curves are obtained on the basis of the estimated 
functions of money demand. In the period before stabilisation, inflation 
over 30% which prevailed at that time, would result in additional real 
inflation tax revenues. According to the estimated equation, the level of 
revenue maximizing inflation in Croatia stood at 175.5% monthly. 
Under such circumstances it would, however, be uncertain whether the 
demand for money would have fallen together with inflation (the 
elasticity was -0.5698*B) or would that mechanism have started to 
accelerate. Then, the B*pre would be lower than the estimated one. 
 
 
In the period after the stabilisation there was a considerable change in 
the possibility to finance government expenditures with inflation tax. 
The maximum of the inflation tax revenues can now be achieved at 
much lower inflation rate (31.3% monthly) and the decrease of the 
maximum level from 67% of the GDP in the period before stabilisation 
to the 12% of GDP in the period after stabilisation leads to a conclusion 
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that there is not much room for inflationing the Croatian economy. To a 
stronger inflationary shock the Croatian economy would react with 
heavy substitution of domestic currency. In this way, the reversal of 
inflation to its stabilisation level would result in lower inflation tax, and 
at higher rates of inflation, even in its absolute decline. 
 
Econometric estimation of the normal tax in Croatia in the period before 
and after stabilisation. 
 
The normal tax function follows the Tanzi's assumption of variable price 
elasticity of the real revenues from "normal" sources, with an additional 
structural shift variable in the period after stabilisation. The equation is 
estimated for the period December 1991 - December 1994: 
 
In (Tt/Yt) = -1.0178 - 0.7759 INFLAt - 2.1870 (INFLAt*DUM9311Xt) 
                 (-28.70)   (-4.62)             (-0.61) 
 
RBAR2=0.4256; DW=1.71; SEE=0.1254; F=74; Period: 91:12-94:12 
 
where Tt/Yt denotes the ratio of tax revenues in the Croatian GDP 
accounted on the cash basis, and INFLAt and DUM9311Xt denotes the 
rate of inflation and the structural shift variable, respectively, like in the 
last equation. 
 
The estimates show that at zero rate of inflation, there is the real tax 
burden of the GDP that amounts to 36%. Any price increase causes the 
erosion of the real tax revenues lowering this ratio. This statement 
holds in the period before stabilisation, and for the period after the 
stabilisation as well. In the period before stabilisation the price elasticity 
of real tax burden of the Croatian GDP was -0.7759*B. In the period 
after stabilisation the estimated price elasticity is -2.9629*B , although 
with unsatisfying statistical properties. 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the estimated values of the share of the normal 
taxes in GDP in the period before and after stabilisation. Steeper slope 
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of the curve in the period after stabilisation is the consequence of 
higher price elasticity in that period. These findings imply the possibility 
of the functioning of the "ratchet effect" in the relationship between the 
inflation and the tax revenues. Lowering inflation will result in the 
increase of the real tax revenues and in lower budget deficit, while a 
subsequent increase in inflation to the initial level would cause even 
higher deficit then the one which could have been possible in the initial 
period. The moral of this result for the fiscal policy in Croatia is that any 
renewal of the inflation at the prestabilisationary level of about 30% a 
month would be disastrous for the public finances, and for the 




Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the values of the total real tax burden and its 
components in the period before and after the implementation of the 
stabilisation programme. The rate of inflation maximizing total potential 
fiscal burden in the period before stabilisation was 140.2% a month 
 98
(Figure 5). At this rate of inflation there would be a great loss of the 
real tax revenues, whereby the ratio of the real tax revenues in the 
GDP would fall to only 11.3%. This could result in huge deficit financed 
wholly from an unstable and uncertain source as the inflation tax. 
 
However, in the period after stabilisation, the situation is completely 
opposite. The maximum of the fiscal burden can now be achieved at 
the zero rate of inflation. Although the inflation tax maximizing rate of 
inflation now amounts 31.3% monthly, as we already emphasised, the 










Inflation was not to the benefit of the Croatian fiscal policy neither 
before the implementation of the stabilisation programme, nor in the 
poststabilisation period. The analysis showed that in Croatia, inflation 
always has negative effects on the revenues from the normal taxes, 
that is, every inflation opens big possibilities for entering into the fiscal 
deficit. 
 
For Croatia, the better economic future will certainly come. However, 
the road to that future will be to a great part determined by the 
economic policy of today. The empirical finding of this paper is that the 
inflation tax in the period after stabilisation in Croatia could be 
maximized at high rates of 31.3% monthly. For some, it can serve as 
an argument in favour of a statement that inflation is needed, but this 
is just one side of the medal. Inflationary erosion of the normal taxes is 
much stronger then the inflationary component of total taxes. Any 
involvement in inflationing of the Croatian economy in order to 
"finance" faster economic activity would result not only in a loss of the 
real tax revenues and in deficit, but it would also have the opposite 
effect - the loss of the total real fiscal revenues. Price stability 
guarantees the stability of financial sources for the economic recovery 






Aghevli, Bijan B. and Mohsin Khan (1977): Inflationary Finance and the Dynamics of 
Inflation: Indonesia, 1951-1972, American Economic Review, Vol. 67, pp. 390-403. 
 
Aghevli, Bijan B. and Mohsin Khan (1978): Government Deficits and the Inflationary 
Process in Developing Countries, IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 26, pp. 383-416. 
 
Anušić, Zoran, Željko Rohatinski and Velimir Šonje (ed.)(1995): A Road to Low 
Inflation: Croatia 1993-1994, The Government of the Republic of Croatia, Zagreb. 
 
Cagan, Phillip (1956): The Monetary Dinamics of Hyperinflation, In The Theory of 
Inflation, Michael Parkin (ed.), pp. 185-278. 
 
Canavese, Alfredo J. and Daniel Heymann (1992): Fiscal Lags and the High Inflation 
Trap, Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Vol. 32, No.2, pp. 100-109. 
 
Choudhry, Nurun N. (1990): Fiscal Revenue and Inflationary Finance, IMF 
Working Paper, WP/90/48. 
 
Dornbusch, R. (1991): Experiences with Extreme Monetary Instability, in: 
Commander, S., ed., Managing Inflation in Socialist Economies in Transition., EDI 
Seminar Series, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank: 175196. 
 
Franco, Gustavo H.B. (1990): Fiscal Reforms and Stabilization: Four Hyperinflation 
Cases Examined, The Economic Journal, 100, pp. 176-187. 
 
Gapinski, J.H. (1982): Macroeconomic Theory: Statics, Dynamics, and Policy, 
Economics Handbook Series, New York: McGraw-Hill. 
 
Hwang, H. (1985): Test of the Adjustment Process and Linear Homogeneity in a 
Stock Adjustment Model of Money Demand, Review of Economics and Statistics, 67: 
689-692. 
Kiguel, Miguel A. (1989): Budget Deficits, Stability and Monetary Dynamics of 
Hyperinflation, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 148-
157. 
 
Nestić, Danijel and Velimir Šonje (1994): Stopping High Inflation in an Exsocialist 
Country: the Case of Croatia 1993/1994, Croatian Economic Survey, pp. 19-61. 
 
 102
Olivera, Julio H.G. (1967): Money, Prices and Fiscal Lags: A Note on the Dynamics 
of Inflation, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, No. 82, pp. 258-
268. 
Patinkin, D. (1965): Money, Interest, and Prices., New York: Harper and Row. 
 
Sachs, Jeffrey (1986): The Bolivian Hyperinflation and Stabilization, Working 
Paper No. 2073, NBER, Inc., pp. 1-47. 
 
Sachs, Jeffrey and P. Larrain (1993): Macroeconomics in the Global Economy, 
Harvester, Wheatsheaf. 
 
Sadka, Efraim (1990): An Inflation-proof Tax System? Some Lessons from Israel, 
IMF Working Paper, WP/90/46, pp. 1-23. 
 
Tanzi, Vito (1978): Inflation, Real Tax Revenue, and the Case for Inflationary 
Finance: Theory with an Application to Argentina, IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 25, No. 
3, pp. 417-451. 
 
Végh, Carlos A. (1992): Stopping High Inflation, An Analyticial Overview, IMF Staff 
Papers, Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 626-695. 
